Published Jun 14, 2026 | 3:06 PM ⚊ Updated Jun 14, 2026 | 3:06 PM
Representative image. (iStock)
Synopsis: While designed to curb opportunistic party-switching and ensure legislative stability, anti-defection laws have paradoxically become instruments for engineered splits and political vendettas. Disgruntled factions portray their exits as ideological or anti-corruption crusades, yet they often secure personal gains in new alliances. The human cost includes eroded independence, weakened Opposition, and voter cynicism. Splinter groups proliferate from engineered vendettas, not organic evolution.
Anti-defection laws, designed to curb opportunistic party-switching and ensure legislative stability, have paradoxically become instruments for engineered splits and political vendettas. In India, the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, introduced via the 52nd Amendment in 1985 and refined by the 91st Amendment in 2003, disqualifies legislators who voluntarily abandon party membership or defy party whips.
Yet, the “merger” exception, allowing two-thirds of a legislative party to merge with another without penalty, has opened floodgates for splinter groups and calculated revenge politics.
The 2003 amendment removed the earlier one-third “split” provision, which had been shamelessly misused to engineer wholesale defections under the guise of factionalism. Lawmakers intended the merger clause as a safeguard for genuine dissent and party realignments.
In practice, it has legitimised bulk betrayals. A group coordinating just enough numbers can rebrand a rebellion as a “merger,” evade disqualification, and topple governments or weaken rivals. This numerical game has turned defections from individual indiscipline into orchestrated political warfare.
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Recent cases illustrate this vividly, with West Bengal emerging as a stark example of splinter politics laced with vengeance. In 2026, the Trinamool Congress (TMC) faced a major parliamentary split as around 19-20 rebel MPs, led by figures such as Kakoli Ghosh Dastidar and including Saayoni Ghosh and Satabdi Roy, claimed support exceeding the two-thirds threshold in the party’s 28 Lok Sabha seats.
These rebels announced backing for the NDA, sought separate recognition from the Lok Sabha Speaker, and framed their move as a legitimate realignment amid allegations of corruption and dynastic leadership under Abhishek Banerjee.
This brazen bid exploits the merger loophole, allowing the splinter group to potentially retain seats while dismantling Mamata Banerjee’s parliamentary strength. Similar unrest brews among MLAs, echoing earlier patterns of factional exits.
The Bengal saga is deeply rooted in personal rivalries and vengeance. Suvendu Adhikari’s high-profile 2020 defection from TMC to BJP, driven by alleged power struggles with Abhishek Banerjee, triggered a cascade of followers switching sides. Post-2026 BJP gains under Adhikari as the chief minister, combined with central probes against TMC leaders, have intensified retaliatory splintering.
Disgruntled factions portray their exits as ideological or anti-corruption crusades, yet they often secure personal gains in new alliances. This has fragmented TMC into competing claims — original vs. rebel — fuelling Election Commission disputes over symbols and further eroding public trust in the process.
In Maharashtra, the 2022-2023 Shiv Sena split saw Eknath Shinde’s faction align with the BJP, claiming a merger-like realignment that bypassed scrutiny.
Similarly, the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) fractured when Ajit Pawar led a significant bloc to the ruling alliance. These manoeuvres sparked vicious cycles of vengeance, with disgruntled leaders facing internal marginalisation or agency probes orchestrating exits that weaken parent parties while securing fiefdoms.
Karnataka’s 2019 drama, where rebel Congress and JD(S) MLAs resigned en masse to enable a BJP government, highlights how splinter tactics exploit procedural gaps.
Resignations sidestep direct disqualification, but ensuing vendettas through petitions and retaliatory moves further illustrate the law’s failure to protect voter mandates, instead fueling horse-trading.
The politics of vengeance adds a toxic layer across these cases. Defections often stem from personal rivalries, denied tickets, or perceived slights rather than ideology.
Central agencies’ actions against dissenters coincide suspiciously with alignments, raising coercion concerns. Splinter groups serve as revenge vehicles: ousted leaders poach loyalists, create “real” party claims, and prioritise survival over governance, turning politics into zero-sum capture and retaliation.
Comparatively, other nations expose India’s vulnerabilities. Bangladesh’s Article 70 imposes near-absolute rigidity, limiting splintering but stifling democracy. Pakistan’s Article 63A targets key votes with patchy enforcement amid vengeance splits.
South Africa abandoned floor-crossing windows due to fragmentation. Israel’s rules curb strategic splintering in coalitions. Mature democracies like the UK, US, and Australia lack formal bans, relying on voter accountability and norms. Floor-crossing happens but rarely destabilises en masse due to cultural deterrents.
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India’s merger loophole uniquely enables “legal” splinter groups while punishing loners, rewarding bulk coordination laced with inducements. Speakers’ partisan delays and judicial interventions offer partial checks but demand reform.
The human cost includes eroded independence, weakened Opposition, and voter cynicism. Splinter groups proliferate from engineered vendettas, not organic evolution.
Reforms, restricting mergers to verified ideological shifts, barring defectors from ministries, empowering the Election Commission, and limiting whips, could balance cohesion with freedom.
Ultimately, splits and splinters under anti-defection regimes reflect weak intra-party democracy where power trumps principle. The politics of vengeance thrives here, subverting stability — one engineered “merger” at a time, as Bengal’s turmoil vividly demonstrates.
(Views are personal.)
