All it requires to make the CBI independent and fair is a simple legislation; what will always be lacking is political will.
A CBI trial court. (Creative Commons)
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) probably was shocked beyond belief when, this January, US President Joe Biden volunteered to allow the principal federal law enforcement agency to search his Delaware home without a search warrant.
In India, on 23 November, Karnataka withdrew its specific consent for the CBI to probe a disproportionate assets case against Deputy Chief Minister DK Shivakumar on the ground that the consent given by the previous BJP government was “illegal”.
Whether it is the withdrawal of specific or general consent for the CBI, there is a growing clamour among the states to disallow probes against people within their respective jurisdictions by India’s premier investigative agency, deeming it to be acting under the influence of the Union government.
If the popular strongman game, like the “high striker” found in funfairs, were to test the integrity of the Indian polity, the puck wouldn’t rise an inch, however strong the mallet’s strike.
That might be the difference in approach to governance between the two countries.
It is not about which of them is less corrupt. You will reach nowhere trying to find that out. It is about the willingness of the politicians at the helm to subscribe to the principles of probity their country’s Constitutions offer.
India has a long-practised binary for investigating corruption, especially by those in powerful positions, whether politicians, bureaucrats, or officials — the ruling dispensation versus the Opposition binary.
It works on a simple principle: The Opposition insists the ruling party never investigates itself and uses central probe agencies to harass Opposition politicians. The ruling party denies the charge.
This system has sustained itself thanks to patronage by political parties as and when they assumed power. It now affects Centre-State relations in states where the same party does not rule both.
That damages the spirit of India’s federalism.
Take South India as an example. Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Telangana and Karnataka have withdrawn consent to the CBI. Their ruling parties are in Opposition to the Union government led by the BJP. Andhra Pradesh also withdrew consent when the ruling TDP had issues with the BJP. The consent was restored after the friendly YSRCP came to power.
Each state feels the Union government has targeted it by unleashing the CBI — or other agencies like the Enforcement Directorate (ED) or the Income-Tax Department — on them.
The Union government has never fully convinced the states — or showed any inclination to — that it does not influence the functioning of the CBI or explain why election times witness a sudden spurt in probes by these agencies.
When UPA was helming the Centre, facing a barrage of corruption charges, including the infamous Coalgate levelled by the BJP, the Reuters agency quoted then BJP’s Leader of Opposition in the Rajya Sabha as saying in May 2013, “Considering the enormous amount of misuse of political clout, the CBI has lost its credibility.”
Precisely what the Opposition-ruled states which have withdrawn consent to CBI say at present.
In March this year, Telangana Chief Minister K Chandrashekar Rao was among the Opposition signatories in a letter to the Prime Minister saying, “Blatant misuse of central agencies against the members of the Opposition appeared to suggest that the country had transitioned from being a democracy to an autocracy.”
There appears no end to this see-saw battle over the CBI. Though unproven, political influence has, over the decades, damaged the image of the CBI as one that does the Union government’s bidding.
Why, even the Supreme Court entered the frame when, in 2013, Justice RM Lodha remarked the CBI was a “caged parrot” and “its master’s voice”.
There are ways to rectify the situation and restore the agency’s image and role. However, there is one impediment, as articulated by Joginder Singh, a former CBI director sacked for wanting to push a probe against a VIP in Bihar. The Karnataka cadre officer once said: “The political class will never give independence to the CBI.”
The solution is not too far-fetched. Several parliamentary committees have discussed the issue and come out with suggestions. The only problem with the CBI is that it is not a statutory body, and many of its personnel are not permanent; they are on deputations.
The agency lords over an enormous empire, powered to probe offences under 69 central laws, 231 sections of the IPC and 18 state Acts.
However, it is reined in by its mother legislation, the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act of 1946. Its jurisdiction extends only to the Union Territories, where the agency can probe. When it comes to the states, the latter’s sanction is compulsory.
This weakness makes it a toy for politicians to play with.
The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice recommended long ago a separate statute to govern the CBI, defining its status, functions and powers, and laying down safeguards to ensure objectivity and impartiality in its functioning.
The question is, who will bell the cat?
The Supreme Court recently said politicians cannot be placed on a “pedestal higher than the citizens” and cannot seek “special treatment under law and immunity from arrest”.
And, in 2017, the Union government told Parliament that it had not yet decided on exclusive legislation to empower CBI and erase its weaknesses. With that remark, the question changes to why anyone will bell the cat.
May 11, 2024
May 11, 2024
May 11, 2024
May 11, 2024
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May 11, 2024
