Published May 16, 2026 | 12:34 AM ⚊ Updated May 16, 2026 | 12:34 AM
The Telangana High Court. (Official website)
Synopsis: Justice T Madhavi Devi said she had gone through the victim’s statement and declined to pass any interim orders. The order is likely to be issued during the court’s next sitting.
The vacation bench of the High Court of Telangana declined to grant interim protection from arrest to Bandi Sai Bageerath, who is accused of sexually assaulting a minor girl.
“I have gone through the statement of the victim, and at this stage, I am not willing to pass any interim orders,” Justice T Madhavi Devi said after the hearing that stretched close to midnight on Friday, 15 May.
The order on the plea is likely to be issued during the court’s next sitting.
Counsel for the survivor and the public prosecutor opposed awarding bail to Bageerath, son of the Union Minister of State for Home, Bandi Sanjay Kumar.
Senior Advocate Niranjan Reddy, appearing for the accused, countered the prosecution, asserting that even if the survivor’s allegations were accepted in full, they would at best attract Section 7 of the POCSO Act relating to “sexual assault,” and not the graver provisions under Sections 5 and 6, dealing with penetrative sexual assault.
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Referring to the victim’s statement and the last few lines highlighted by the Public Prosecutor, Reddy argued that the allegations, even if taken at face value, only described conduct punishable under Section 7.
He pointed out that Section 8 of the POCSO Act prescribes punishment below seven years for such offences, thereby strengthening his argument for anticipatory bail.
Reddy then turned to paragraph 12 of the complaint by the girl’s mother, which referred to a “false and malicious complaint” filed at Nirmal Police Station by a person known to the victim and introduced by her to the accused.
He argued that the complaint itself showed the individual was actually the victim’s acquaintance, not someone connected to the accused, and therefore, the allegation that the counter-case was filed solely to intimidate the complainant lacked factual basis.
Reddy countered the victim counsel’s argument that the accused’s father, Union Minister Bandi Sanjay, was using political influence to manipulate the investigation. He pointed out that law and order is a state subject and that the government in Telangana was run by a rival political party.
He further argued that if the accused’s father had truly exercised political influence, there would have been no alteration memo adding graver sections and no alleged “improvements” in the case.
He argued that the sequence of events instead showed that the police had acted independently and even strengthened the case against the accused after recording the victim’s statement.
“If the father had actually used influence as is being alleged, it would not have worked in this particular manner,” he submitted before the court.
He stressed that the mother’s complaint on 8 May was registered “unhindered” and “unimpeded,” and that the police subsequently recorded the victim’s statement and altered sections on their own.
It was also submitted before the court that the survivor’s family was aware of the youngsters’ relationship, and all of them had travelled together to religious places.
It was also pointed out that the survivor herself had sent a movie ticket to the accused after 25 November 2025, the date on which she was allegedly assaulted.
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Pappu Nageswara Rao, the victim’s counsel, argued that the accused was not entitled to relief, given the seriousness of the allegations and the applicability of Sections 5 and 6 of the POCSO Act.
At the outset, the victim’s counsel submitted that the original FIR had invoked offences punishable with less than seven years, and therefore the accused may initially have been entitled to notice under Section 35(3) of the BNSS, equivalent to Section 41A of the old CrPC. However, he argued that the situation changed entirely after the victim’s detailed statement was recorded and graver sections under the POCSO Act were added.
On the issue of age determination, the counsel relied heavily on Section 34 of the POCSO Act read with Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. He argued that the Supreme Court had repeatedly held that age determination must follow the hierarchy prescribed under the Juvenile Justice Act. According to him, the first and most important documents for determining age are school certificates, transfer certificates, and SSC records.
The counsel pointed out that both the SSC certificate and the school transfer certificate reflected the victim’s date of birth as 12 August 2008. He submitted those documents before the court in a sealed cover and argued that once those primary documents were available, reliance on other records became unnecessary. He maintained that even according to the prosecution’s investigation, the victim was born in 2008 and therefore was clearly a minor under the POCSO Act.
When the defence referred to a previous chargesheet allegedly mentioning a different age, the victim’s counsel argued that such material was irrelevant at the bail stage because the legally recognised primary documents established that she was a minor. He said any challenge to those records could only be examined at trial, not while deciding anticipatory bail.
He submitted that mitigating factors or discussions on adolescent consent may become relevant during sentencing or trial, but not when deciding whether anticipatory bail should be granted in a serious POCSO case.
He also rejected the defence argument that the victim’s age, being close to 18, could dilute the offence. Referring to Supreme Court precedents, he argued that even if the victim was short of 18 years by only a few days, she remained a “child” in the eyes of the law, and the beneficial legislation under POCSO could not be diluted.
Addressing the defence claim that the mother’s complaint was legally drafted and therefore omissions in it were significant, the victim’s counsel argued that the mother’s complaint merely reflected what the girl initially disclosed to her. He said many victims, particularly minors, are often reluctant, scared, or emotionally unable to reveal everything immediately, even to their parents.
The counsel told the court that after the complaint was filed, Bharosa Centre counsellors, women police officers, and investigators interacted with the victim in a supportive environment, after which she opened up fully about the incidents. According to him, the detailed allegations emerged during those interactions and were subsequently recorded in her statement.
He further argued that there was no unexplained delay by the police. According to him, after the victim narrated the incidents in detail, the investigating officer immediately altered the sections and invoked the more serious offences.
The victim’s counsel acknowledged that the accused and the girl were in a relationship and may have intended to marry. However, he argued that the relationship itself did not legalise acts prohibited under the POCSO Act because the victim was still a minor. He said the accused had allegedly induced the girl into the relationship through false promises of marriage after she attained majority and exploited her emotional vulnerability.
Referring specifically to paragraph six of the complaint, the counsel argued that the allegations clearly described a vulnerable situation in which the victim was intoxicated, unable to resist effectively, and subjected to acts against her will. He stated that the victim had personally informed him that on the night of the farmhouse incident, she became unusually intoxicated after consuming a drink and later woke up without clothes, unable to fully recall what had happened.
The counsel said the complaint alleged that the accused entered her room during the late-night hours, molested her, touched her inappropriately, and engaged in lewd acts against her will while pressuring her for sex. He argued that the victim’s subsequent statement provided further details of repeated penetrative sexual assault, thereby attracting Section 5(L) of the POCSO Act, which deals with penetrative sexual assault committed more than once on a child.
The victim’s counsel argued that all the defence judgments cited for anticipatory bail involved distinguishable facts or less serious offences under Sections 7 and 8 of the POCSO Act, which carry lower punishment. He pointed out that the present case involved Section 5 and 6 allegations carrying a punishment of up to 20 years imprisonment.
He further argued that Supreme Court orders granting interim protection in some POCSO cases could not automatically apply because the Supreme Court exercises plenary constitutional powers beyond those available to High Courts under anticipatory bail jurisdiction.
To strengthen his opposition, the counsel relied on the Supreme Court judgment in the Sukh Ram Telecom corruption case, particularly observations by Justice KT Thomas regarding custodial interrogation and the danger of the influential accused interfering with the investigation. He argued that effective custodial interrogation becomes difficult when an accused is protected by anticipatory bail and knows he is insulated from arrest.
The victim’s lawyer repeatedly stressed that the accused’s father held a powerful political position as a Union Minister and Member of Parliament from Karimnagar, creating a real apprehension that police officers and officials might attempt to “please” him or leak information to assist the accused.
The counsel questioned why the counter-complaint alleging extortion and “honey-trap” had been registered specifically in Karimnagar when none of the alleged acts took place there. He argued that the case was strategically filed there only because the accused’s father represented Karimnagar politically.
He further alleged that information about the victim attempting to file a complaint had somehow leaked even before the FIR was registered, allowing the accused’s side to allegedly prepare a “counterblast” case in advance.
The victim’s lawyer also referred to allegations in the complaint that, from March 2026 onwards, the family began receiving indirect pressure calls asking them to withdraw the matter. He pointed to paragraph 14 of the complaint alleging that mediators associated with influential persons visited the family and facilitated a meeting with the accused’s father on 23 April 2026.
During that interaction, the victim’s family was allegedly ridiculed, indirectly threatened, and pressured to compromise. He claimed they were advised to sign certain documents at the Nirmal police station and left terrified.
The lawyer argued that the very conduct of the investigation reflected political interference. He alleged that police initially registered only “minor POCSO sections” instead of immediately invoking graver offences despite the seriousness of the allegations. According to him, this happened because officers wanted to “please” the influential ministerial family.
He also claimed that senior political influence could continue affecting the investigation if anticipatory bail were granted. He argued that the accused’s supporters and public speeches by his father were already creating fear in the mind of the victim.
At one point, the counsel remarked that the father’s public speeches appeared intimidating, arguing that such rhetoric could psychologically impact the victim and embolden supporters. However, the court cautioned him that anticipatory bail could not be decided based on public sentiment or political speeches alone and that the court would focus strictly on the law.
The victim’s lawyer further argued that there was a strong likelihood of evidence tampering. He claimed that because the accused’s family occupied positions of influence, they could potentially access police information, influence officers, or shape the direction of the investigation.
The counsel pointed to financial transactions between the accused and the victim, arguing that the accused had allegedly attempted to portray ordinary transfers of money as evidence of extortion or “honey-trap.” He said the accused frequently transferred money to the victim, which she often returned immediately, but later used those transactions to build a narrative against her family.
He alleged that the accused’s side was trying to create material to portray the POCSO complaint as retaliation for the Karimnagar complaint. According to him, this amounted to an attempt to manipulate evidence and influence public perception.
The victim’s lawyer also referred to two prior FIRs against the accused, including an alleged ragging-related incident in college, arguing that he was not a “first-time offender.” However, the defence immediately responded that those FIRs had already been quashed by the High Court.
The counsel additionally claimed that he had heard allegations involving other girls as well, though he admitted he could not verify them and that no formal complaints had yet been filed.
Ultimately, the victim’s lawyer argued that given the political position of the accused’s father, the allegations of intimidation, the possibility of evidence tampering, and the seriousness of the accusations under Sections 5 and 6 of the POCSO Act, this was not a fit case for anticipatory bail.
Bageerath has been accused of sexually assaulting the girl between October and December 2025. The duo had reportedly met through common friends in June 2025. The survivor’s mother alleged that the Bageerath repeatedly abused the girl sexually and emotionally blackmailed her.
