The report described the collapse of the Medigadda piers and the structural weaknesses found in the other two barrages of the Kaleshwaram Lift Irrigation Scheme as “the worst man-made disaster ever in the history of India”.
Published Apr 30, 2025 | 9:42 AM ⚊ Updated Apr 30, 2025 | 9:42 AM
File picture of Medigadda barrage. (X)
Synopsis: The NDSA report on the Medigadda barrage highlighted engineering mismanagement, structural flaws, inadequate planning and systemic oversight. The report recounted the Kaleshwaram project’s disregard for dam safety protocols several times.
The National Dam Safety Authority (NDSA)’s final report, dated 24 April, on the multi-stage Kaleshwaram Lift Irrigation Scheme’s Medigadda barrage is an indictment of engineering mismanagement, structural flaws, inadequate planning and systemic oversight. It said all of them together led to the debacle of the multi-crore project, built by the previous BRS government.
The report described the collapse of the Medigadda piers and the structural weaknesses found in the other two barrages of the Kaleshwaram Lift Irrigation Scheme as “the worst man-made disaster ever in the history of India”.
The project was intended to transform North Telangana’s hinterland into a verdant landscape by harnessing the waters of the Godavari River. Three barrages— Medigadda, Annaram, and Sundilla — part of the project, are designed to store and divert water for irrigation.
On 21 October 2023, the Kaleshwaram project faced a serious setback. Pillar No. 20 in Block 7 of the Medigadda Barrage sank, sending alarm bells ringing on the quality of construction of the entire project. The NDSA report said that by 24 October, the pier had settled by 1.256 metres, accompanied by severe cracking and tilting.
The report described it not as an isolated failure but a symptom of deeper, systemic issues that plagued all three barrages. The sinking pillar prompted immediate inspections by a six-member NDSA committee, revealing a cascade of design, construction, and maintenance deficiencies.
The report pointed out that the Medigadda Barrage, also known as the Lakshmi Barrage, was constructed as a rigid one, intended as a floating structure. Its upstream and downstream secant pile cutoffs were improperly integrated with the raft foundation.
This design-construction mismatch, coupled with inadequate geotechnical investigations, set the stage for disaster. The report said that only six boreholes were drilled at Medigadda against the 85 recommended by the Central Board of Irrigation and Power (CBIP) guidelines, leaving critical geological uncertainties unaddressed.
The result was a barrage vulnerable to piping, a phenomenon where water seeps through the foundation, eroding soil and compromising its stability.
The Annaram and Sundilla barrages, located upstream, echoed Medigadda’s troubles. The NDSA report detailed similar patterns of distress, including seepage, piping and the dislodgment of downstream wearing coats and cement concrete (CC) blocks. A particularly egregious blunder was the relocation of these barrages’ axes — Annaram by 2.2 km and Sundilla by 5.4 km downstream — after construction agreements were signed.
These new sites, below the river bed level, led to significant sand sedimentation, particularly at Annaram, exacerbating operational challenges. Shockingly, no geotechnical investigations were conducted at the new locations, rendering the original Detailed Project Report (DPR) redundant and obsolete.
The DPR itself, prepared in a mere four months instead of the recommended year, was a cornerstone of the project’s troubles. The NDSA report faulted the haste, contending that a well-prepared DPR, grounded in reliable data and comprehensive studies, is essential for techno-economic viability.
The rushed document failed to account for critical variables, including the variability of foundation geology. Significant design changes during construction further deviated from the original plan. A case in point was that sheet piles for cutoffs were replaced with secant piles, and the design flood for Sundilla was found to be inadequate compared to Central Water Commission (CWC) standards.
NDSA laid bare a series of design and construction flaws that compromised the barrages’ integrity. The Central Designs Organisation (CDO), responsible for the barrages’ designs, operated with deficient geotechnical data, finding it a “matter of grave concern” that led to disastrous outcomes.
The CDO’s role was further undermined by its exclusion from planning, investigation, and construction oversight, with higher authorities intervening to push through changes. For example, the removal of keys under the piers in the RCC raft and the replacement of wire gabions with free rip-rap dumps in the upstream apron were made to suit the construction unit’s preferences, not engineering rigour.
Hydraulic and structural design issues compounded these problems. The Gauge-Discharge curve, a fundamental tool for design and model studies, was neither verified nor confirmed by the CDO or the project construction unit. Hydraulic model studies, conducted by the Telangana State Engineering Research Laboratories (TSERL), had failed to account for critical scenarios, such as the crack opening of a single gate at pond level.
This oversight led to hydraulic jumps that washed out downstream aprons and CC blocks as early as 2019, a problem that persisted due to suppressed reporting and operational pressures to keep the barrages functional.
The construction quality control was notably absent, particularly regarding the water-tightness of cutoff walls and their connection to the raft. The NDSA identified these as the primary causes of the distress, with water oozing out downstream of the cutoff walls immediately after the first monsoon in 2019.
The project construction unit’s failure to clear obstructions in front of the barrages, as recommended by TSERL, further exacerbated hydraulic issues.
The NDSA report underscored a gross failure in operation and maintenance (O&M) protocols, which accelerated the barrages’ deterioration.
After its commissioning in 2019, damage to CC blocks, wearing coats, and evidence of piping were observed across all three barrages. Yet, the reservoirs were not depleted for repairs due to governmental pressures, allowing progressive deterioration.
The absence of an Operation and Maintenance manual and non-compliance with the National Dam Safety Act, 2021, further compounded the problem. The Act mandated pre- and post-monsoon inspections, meticulous maintenance records, and annual assessments of scouring and apron damage — none of which were conducted.
The report found that the Irrigation and Command Area Development (I&CAD) Department’s inaction was particularly stark. Despite awareness of the damage, no repairs were undertaken, and maintenance protocols were ignored. The report noted that the lack of periodic inspections by the CDO or other authorities meant that design-to-construction discrepancies went undetected, allowing structural distress to worsen over time.
The report recounted the Kaleshwaram project’s disregard for dam safety protocols several times. The National Dam Safety Act, 2021, enacted to ensure robust surveillance, inspection, and maintenance of dams, was flouted at every turn.
Scheduled inspections, maintenance logbooks, and post-monsoon assessments as per Indian Standard (IS) 7349:2012 were entirely absent. This neglect not only violated legal mandates but also left the barrages vulnerable to progressive damage, culminating in the Medigadda incident.
The report, however, points to a silver lining. It called for a holistic rehabilitation design, encapsulating immediate stabilisation measures, comprehensive geotechnical studies, and advanced geophysical assessments to establish a reliable baseline for future interventions.
Hydraulic and structural designs must be revisited using appropriate modelling software, and interdisciplinary collaboration among stakeholders will be essential for the project’s sustainability.
(Edited by Muhammed Fazil.)
