Judge noted that recent suo motu revisions by the court are being looked upon by some as a witch hunt by one judge of the court.
Published Sep 15, 2023 | 8:22 AM ⚊ Updated Sep 15, 2023 | 8:22 AM
The decision-making by the high court is an institutional action and not the action of any particular judge, Justice Anand Venkatesh said.
The suo moto revision case against the acquittal of Tamil Nadu Minister K Ponmudi in a disproportionate asset (DA) matter was not the act of a lone judge, but of the high court as an institution, Justice Anand Venkatesh of the Madras High Court said while turning down pleas by the minister and the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption (DVAC) to recuse himself from the case.
The power to initiate revisions was exercised by the high court as an institution to ensure that the criminal justice system “is not subverted and remains pure and unsullied”, he added.
In an earlier hearing, the DVAC and minister Ponmudi contended that the court had prejudged the issue and argued that the judge must recuse himself from the case as per Section 190(c) CrPC, which states that a judge initiating suo motu proceedings should not hear the matter.
“At this juncture, this court observes that the suo motu revisions initiated over the past few weeks have been looked upon in some quarters as a sort of witch hunt spearheaded by one judge of the high court.
“It is, therefore, necessary to remind all concerned that these suo motu revisions have been exercised not by one judge but by the high court, as an institution, to ensure that the streams of criminal justice are not subverted and remain pure and unsullied,” Justice Venkatesh said.
He added: “The orders of the high court resonate the voice of not any individual judge but one institution. In other words, decision-making by the high court is an institutional action and not the action of any particular judge.
“This is in keeping with the role of the high court as a constitutional court vested with the power of judicial and administrative superintendence over the courts subordinate to it.”
The judge questioned the very plea of bias, saying: “Coming to the issue of bias, from the standpoint of the state, this is certainly a very strange plea.”
“While this court has no quarrel on the applicable test for adjudging a plea of bias, the question must ultimately boil down to the person who raises such a plea. This is because a plea of bias presupposes that a person alleging bias on the part of the adjudicator entertains a reasonable apprehension that the adjudicator would pass orders adverse to him,” the judge said.
Overruling the DVAC objection that the suo motu powers of revision of the court under Section 397 CrPC have interfered with the right of appeal of the state, the judge said that even assuming that the order of acquittal passed by the Special Court is to be set aside, the state would be a direct beneficiary, for it would be achieving the same result that it would achieve by filing an appeal.
“It is, therefore, is very strange and curious that the state must allege bias, especially since it claims to be a person aggrieved against the orders of the Special Court, and is contemplating filing an appeal under Section 378 CrPC.
“It is, therefore, a mystery as to why the mighty state is shooting a plea of bias at this court from the shoulders of the accused. For the aforesaid reasons, the plea of bias alleged by the state must be rejected as completely misconceived,” Justice Venkatesh said.
He said that the test of a reasonable likelihood of bias must be assessed in the light of the oath of office taken by the judge to administer justice without fear or favour, affection or ill will, and his ability to carry out the oath by reason of his training and experience whereby he is in a position to disabuse his mind of any irrelevant personal belief or predisposition or unwarranted apprehensions.
Justice Venkatesh referred to the Supreme Court’s judgement in the Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. (Recusal Matter) v. Union of India (Recusal Matter) case, where it is observed: “A judge may recuse at his own, from a case entrusted to him by the chief justice. That would be a matter of his own choosing. But recusal at the asking of a litigating party, unless justified, must never to be acceded to. For that would give the impression, of the judge had been scared out of the case, just by the force of the objection. A judge, before he assumes his office, takes an oath to discharge his duties without fear or favour. He would breach his oath of office, if he accepts a prayer for recusal, unless justified.”
The judge adjourned the case to 9 October for arguments, mentioning that a fresh roster will come into effect from the first week of October and these matters can be taken up and heard at length once the next roster is notified by the Madras High Court.
