Manmohan Singh is no longer just the name of an individual; it represents a transformative phase in India’s post-independent socio-economic and political trajectory.
Published Jan 15, 2025 | 9:00 AM ⚊ Updated Jan 15, 2025 | 9:40 AM
Yogendra Yadav and Manmohan Singh.
Last week, Jagruta Karnataka, an organisation of progressive activists and academics, hosted an event in Bengaluru, “Manmohan Singh’s Policies: India’s Present and Future“, in memory of former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
Unlike a conventional commemorative event, the organisers had a proclaimed intention of making it a critical discussion on Singh’s policies.
Hence, renowned socialist thinker and political activist Yogendra Yadav, along with Ateeq Ahmed—who had worked closely with Manmohan Singh during his tenure as prime minister and is now the Principal Secretary of the Chief Minister and Finance Department of Karnataka—were key speakers.
Additionally, a panel comprising individuals from diverse social and academic backgrounds was thoughtfully constituted to facilitate a structured discussion.
However, the main speeches—especially that of Yadav—focused more on critiquing the critics of Singh’s policies especially the Left, in which he is a part of, as an end note rather than conducting an impartial analysis of Singh’s policies and its continuity in the present. Some of his sweeping justifications for Singh’s policies would have surprised and perhaps disappointed some of the audience.
Due to unavoidable circumstances, I could not attend the event in person. However, I listened to the video recording of the whole event which is in the public domain.
Manmohan Singh is no longer just the name of an individual; it represents a transformative phase in India’s post-independent socio-economic and political trajectory.
His policies were not solely his own but rather a collective path chosen by the ruling class and political parties of that era, including the Congress party, with near-unanimity. Thus, critiquing Singh’s policies should not be intended or perceived as a criticism of an individual but should provide an analysis of the ruling elite’s choices during that time, which often diverged from the aspirations of the Constitution.
Such critiques allow us to draw lessons from history and shape the future, unlike the oft-repeated justification of “There Was No Alternative” (TINA), which is of little utility.
Unfortunately, Yadav’s speech did not only advocate “There was No Alternative” but also implied that “There Is No Alternative” since there is no convincing and demonstrable socialist alternative. This approach not only limits critical engagement with history but also stifles the imagination of alternate pathways.
Yadav in a rather unusual way, made such sweeping statements, which begs critical questioning with all due respect.
A few observations that he made in the beginning about the assessment of an ex-prime minister were correct. For example, Yadav rightly pointed out that admiring Singh solely for being one of the most scholarly prime ministers is insufficient. A diverse country like India needs a person of wisdom and a commitment to public welfare more than the additional qualifications of scholarship.
Similarly, Singh’s tendency to consult others before making decisions should not be viewed as a flaw; deliberation is essential to democratic governance. Yadav’s critique of the lack of such consultation in later decisions, such as demonetisation, highlights its value.
But even such traits of MMS need some critical probing:
1. Was Singh, as Ateek Ahmaad extolled as a virtue, more attuned to expert advice than to the voices of the people, elected representatives, or social movements?
2. Did Singh primarily focus on technical aspects of issues while paying less attention to their political implications as Yadav is now reassessing as a virtue?
3. Were several pro-people schemes implemented during Singh’s tenure as prime minister, despite his reservations as anti-market friendly, as noted by those who worked closely with him?
For instance, noted economist Arun Kumar recently wrote in The Wire that Singh did not entirely support many welfare schemes enacted during the UPA-1 period, which were at odds with market-driven policies. Kumar also indicates how Singh served regimes of -License Control Raj and the market reforms without any difference.
Similarly, Devaki Jain, a Gandhian thinker and renowned social activist who worked with Singh during the South Commission, observed that Singh showed little inclination to grasp the wisdom emerging from people’s movements. She even recounted how he once admitted he did not fully understand people’s movements.
It is also documented by the people who knew Singh closely that he offered to resign seven times from his job in his expansive career as a bureaucrat to finance minister to prime minister from the 1970s to 2014.
Out of the seven occasions, five were on account of personal remarks against his persona by those who were at the helm of the affairs and twice on refusing to change his policy on reducing fertiliser subsidy and refusing to retract from the pro-US civil nuclear deal.
In hindsight, one can conclude that both those policies compromised India’s agrarian sovereignty and nuclear sovereignty in favour of Western domination. This has been further aggravated during the regime of Narendra Modi in the past 10 years.
Exploring these questions is essential for understanding the long-term implications of Singh’s policies and envisioning alternatives for the future. Rather than accepting the inevitability of these choices, it is time to critically assess them with the benefit of hindsight. Only through such nuanced analysis can we derive meaningful lessons from history.
Hence, Yadav’s uncritical endorsement of Singh’s policies (there was not even a mild criticism) as an inevitable choice because of the failure and the problems of the previous Licence Raj regime and that Singh’s version of liberalisation was not market fundamentalism begs a lot of questions.
Dear Yogendra Yadav Ji,
1. How did the Secretary of the south become commissar of the North?
The basic premise of the endorsement of the 1991 reforms lies in the crisis that the earlier regime had pushed the country and that “There Was No Alternative” factor.
But you must be aware of the fact that Singh served as the Secretary General of the South Commission from 1987-1990, a body of poor countries constituted as an antidote to the North Commission of rich countries, entirely to explore the ways to escape from the neocolonial clutches of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, the instruments of the North. The Report of the South Commission, of which Singh was also an author, suggested the possible ways of self-reliance and the most needed south-south cooperation. But Singh, who was the votary of this south agenda in 1990, became the commissar of the IMF recipe of the North in 1991! How was this 180 turn possible for a man of the stature like Singh? There is nothing to suggest that he did even explore the possibility of the south agenda during his regime.
Joseph E Stiglitz, the ex-chief of the World Bank and a Nobel laureate, in his seminal work “Globalisation and Its Discontents”, has demonstrated how the reforms enforced by the IMF on countries like India have resulted in skewed growth and increased inequalities and immense miseries to the bottom deciles of the populations.
Hence, more than the lack of alternative solutions for the 1991 “crisis”, the regime, the ruling elite, and the class behind it opted for a particular type of “reforms”, whose interests were described as the national interests then.
How is it that socialists like you who could tear such masks those days are consciously refusing to even remember that now?
2. Humanist capitalism or existential manoeuvres?
You took serious objections to irresponsible tendencies to equate the Liberalisation, Privatisation, and Globalisation (LPG) policies of Singh as the genesis of capitalism in India. You were absolutely right on that count. As you in your analysis and Ateek in his deliberation made it clear India has always been a capitalist state with different forms since 1947. This was correct and a great admission of historical fact.
But the only problem is, this reasoning is in defence of Singh’s policies and not as a socialist critique of the same. Many economists and political leaders of Marxist persuasion have been saying this for a long time. But the Socialists, especially those who were enamoured by the guise and glitter of the Nehruvian policies, had been hailing the pre-91 regime as Nehruvian Socialist. That one could find many virtues in the Nehruvian era when compared to Modi’s misrule is undisputable but doesn’t one be able to also see the capitalist continuity?
Thus if one concede that India’s 75 years of development have been primarily driven by a capitalist model, doesn’t this imply that the principal beneficiaries and the guiding source of this model were always the capitalist classes? Wouldn’t any benefits accruing to other sections of society in this model be considered unintended byproducts rather than deliberate outcomes?
Don’t the capitalist models before 1991, after 1991, and post-2014 share significant continuities and similarities?
Regardless of the government in power, hasn’t the economy consistently served the interests of the capitalist class, aligning with the evolving demands of capitalism? If people-centric schemes existed occasionally, should we differentiate them as manifestations of “humane capitalism” versus “brutal capitalism”?
Much is made out of some of the right-based safety net policies adopted by Singh during UPA-1. But then Congress had 145 seats and depended more on the Left parties which had 61 seats. The mandate itself was against the ruthless and blatant “Shining Capitalist India” under the NDA led by the BJP. As mentioned earlier, senior economists like Arun Kumar have pointed to the fact that Singh was not favorably disposed to such safety nets.
Those anecdotes apart, aren’t the safety net policies often the capitalist regime resort to an existential device of Capitalism at some historic juncture when its existence is threatened by the political or economic crisis?
After World War II, Europe adopted Keynesian economic models, which, while reducing profit rates for capitalists, introduced welfare policies such as free education, healthcare, and income security. These measures were arguably designed to curb the appeal of communism in the Western hemisphere.
However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, when capitalism faced no systemic rival, Europe gradually abandoned welfare measures, transitioning to a neoliberal capitalist model. Didn’t institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and WTO impose structural adjustments on the Global South, including India, to expand global capitalist dominance?
Thus, were or weren’t the economic policies implemented by the Rao-Manmohan Singh duo in the 1990s merely a response to the changing needs of domestic and global capital, similar to the paths chosen by 81 other nations post 1991 at the instance of IMF? Were these policies dictated both by external pressures and the internal necessity of the Capitalist class?
If Singh’s economic reforms primarily catered to the requirements of global and domestic capitalism rather than safeguarding the interests of the nation, aren’t we still following the same trajectory today? Without critically analyzing this continuity, what lessons can we truly learn for the future?
3. Indian Big Capital was ready for reforms, Was the masses ready?
You argued that Singh did not advocate for a free market at the time of independence but only after 1991, hence he is not a market fundamentalist. But market or capitalist fundamentalism considers the capitalist market as the ultimate solution and adhering every other consideration of the market. And that is what Singh’s policies did. That is the capitalist logic. But as a socialist should you abandon questioning whether India’s farmers, laborers, and lower-middle-class populations were either ready for or demanded economic liberalisation? While liberalisation removed regulatory constraints on private capital, didn’t it simultaneously dismantle protective mechanisms for weaker sections like small farmers and businesses, leaving them vulnerable to market forces?
4. Don’t the LPG policies have no bearing on farmers’ suicides?
You claimed that Singh’s economic policies were unrelated to farmer suicides and went so far as to assert that farmer movements amplified the discourse around suicides post-1996, hence it has become a debating topic and not because it was a new phenomenon. Isn’t this a rather sweeping statement for a responsible, socialist thinker? While it’s true that pre-1991 policies were not particularly farmer-friendly, the post-1991 policies arguably worsened the crisis. Reduced government support, compulsory imports, falling prices, and mounting debt all contributed to increasing farmer distress, resulting in increasing suicides. Isn’t it essential to revisit this crisis and its continuing legacy with a more critical lens?
5. Why did the UPA did not implement Swaminathan Commission Recommendations?
You and Ahmad highlighted that the government’s terms of trade have historically been against farmers and that Manmohan Singh responded with measures like farm loan waivers. However, why didn’t Singh implement the Swaminathan Commission’s 2006 recommendation for MSP (Minimum Support Price) calculating the cost and price of farming as C2+50% which would have altered the terms of trade in favour of farmers? Was it not the neoliberal economic policies, pursued by the regimes from Singh to Modi that prioritised corporate profits at the expense of farmer welfare?
6. Did the jobless growth reduce poverty?
You acknowledged that post-1991 economic reforms increased wealth and reduced poverty. But you were also one of the critiques of UPA regimes which is characterised by the phenomenon of “jobless growth.” If unemployment and agricultural crises and hence loss of income were self-evident during this period, how can the claims of poverty reduction be accepted without a critical inquiry? Isn’t this a contradiction? If this claim is correct Wouldn’t Modi’s claims of lifting millions out of poverty also then appear equally valid, despite ground realities showing worsening inequality and distress?
7. Isn’t the corporate “growth” of UPA-2, a systemic corruption making welfare anemic?
While Singh may not have been personally corrupt, didn’t his government’s policies between 2009-2014 benefit large corporations disproportionately? For instance, corporate debt and resource allocations vastly exceeded welfare expenditures like MNREGA. Isn’t this institutional corruption, which the Modi regime has merely continued?
8. Why shouldn’t the government run a business?
You argued against government intervention in sectors outside education and healthcare. Yet, many public sector enterprises outperform private ones in terms of profitability, employment generation, and social equity. How does this align with your position? On the contrary, the private sector has betrayed the nation despite tax cuts and productivity-linked incentives for corporations.
9. Didn’t Manmohanomics lead to Modinomics?
You suggested that Singh’s model represents “humane capitalism” compared to Modi’s “anti-people capitalism.” However, isn’t the privatisation of education, healthcare, and reduced government involvement in welfare programs rooted in Singh’s neoliberal framework? Aren’t Modi’s policies a continuation, or even a worse mimic of the same?
10. Are economic crisis and strengthening of rights unrelated?
You argued that economic reforms have no connection to the rise of communal fascism. However, wasn’t the social discontent and insecurity unleashed by post-1991 reforms fertile ground for communal ideologies? The growing appeal of right-wing movements in Europe and America during economic crises demonstrates a similar pattern. Isn’t this worth deeper exploration?
11. Shouldn’t one explore the path of contemporary socialism or resort to capitalism with a humane mask?
You mentioned that the time is ripe for Left agendas but criticised socialists for focusing only on expenditures without addressing resource mobilization. You also contradicted by equating socialism with the Licence Raj regime, which you admitted as one form of Indian state capitalism. What is your stance on demand-side economics? Isn’t the Left of all hues, including Thomas Picketty, demanding wealth and the imposition of such other taxes on the rich for resource mobilisations? Why do you prefer to forget the same in an urge to imply socialist agenda is irrational or irresponsible? Though demand-side economics itself is not a socialist economy, there are and were many socialist experiments all over the world to organise the economy beyond the state and market binary keeping communities and toiling people at the centre. Such experiments took place in revolutionary Russia, Revolutionary China, Vietnam, Cuba, and also in many post-revolutionary welfarist Latin American regimes. Many such experiments are made in many post-colonial nationalist African countries which are documented in detail in the report of the South Commission of which Singh was the author.
Yes, as you said we have to revisit the history. Not just to find reasons and arguments for establishing the inevitability of barbaric capitalism with human faces but also to revive socialistic experiments with new insights and lessons in a world where there is no existing socialism anywhere.
Socialists should not compromise by choosing “the lesser of two evils,” on the contrary they should actively pursue an alternative vision.
(Shivasundar is an activist and columnist based in Bengaluru. Views are personal. Edited by Majnu Babu).
