If we try to answer the basic question — why did Musi flood now? — We can clearly see the corruption, negligence, and servility of our political and administrative systems. This time, the flood was certainly not an act of nature.
Published Oct 10, 2025 | 8:00 AM ⚊ Updated Oct 10, 2025 | 8:00 AM
An overflowing Musi River flooding the area near the MGBS in Hyderabad.
Synopsis: The recent flooding caused by the Musi River in Hyderabad made thousands homeless and destitute. However, the primary reason for the flood was not heavy rains but officials releasing huge quantities of water from Himayat Sagar and Osman Sagar — without warning, by opening all gates at once, releasing 30,000 cusecs of water.
This is an occasion when both an ancient river, which had long forgotten that it was a river and thought itself merely a filthy sewer bearing the reek of a crore people’s waste, and the people around it, were suddenly reminded that it was, after all, a river of life. Musi swelled. Musi surged. It overflowed, submerging the habitations in and around Hyderabad that had grown along both its banks.
Thousands became homeless and destitute. In the end, even the massive bus station built in its bed went under. No one knows how much filth it washed away, or how many memories, necessities, and lives it swept off — but it has certainly stirred up many questions that must be thought over.
For several decades, scientists and environmentalists have been warning us about the dire consequences of global warming and climate change. Those warnings have now entered everyone’s daily experience.
Untimely rains, seasons that come and go without rhythm, unbearable heat, excessive rains or none at all, and ever-shorter winters — altogether, the climate is no longer as calm as it was even four or five decades ago. Rains no longer come in the monsoon season alone.
The so-called annual rainfall that once fell gently over weeks now pours down in one or two days. Rain no longer means a steady drizzle from sky-wide clouds; it means monstrous cumulonimbus clouds emptying their enormous contents all at once.
People who have gradually learned to live with such natural irregularities were surprised this year when, after two rainless months of monsoon, there suddenly came torrential downpours. And amid those rains, the Musi was suddenly in flood.
From Gandhamguda to Nagole in Hyderabad, thousands of homes of poor and middle-class people on both banks of the Musi went under. At Bapu Ghat bridge near Langar Houz, water touched the bridge; at Chaderghat causeway, it rose six feet above; at Moosarambagh bridge, 10 feet. One can scarcely imagine how much water must have rushed through.
Many recalled the Musi floods of 1908. However, there is a vast difference between those floods and these. The 1908 floods were purely natural. Heavy rains in Ananthagiri, Vikarabad, and Tandur caused the Musi to overflow. It is estimated that at least 15,000 people perished in Hyderabad then.
Learning from that calamity — the immense loss of life and property — the rulers built Himayat Sagar and Osman Sagar across the river precisely to prevent such disasters. Since those large reservoirs and dams were built upstream, there was no possibility of a flood like 1908. Then why did we have the 2025 floods? Were there torrential rains upstream? Meteorological reports say no.
Officials released huge quantities of water from Himayat Sagar and Osman Sagar — without warning, by opening all gates at once, releasing 30,000 cusecs of water. That caused the flood. Did those officials not know that such a hurried action would inundate downstream areas and cause devastation? And that such water should not be released without warnings, evacuations, or rehabilitation plans?
As soon as the gates were opened, water rushed forth like untamed horses, flooding in minutes the localities of Langar Houz, Karwan, Jiyaguda, Purana Pul, Chaderghat, Moosanagar, Shankar Nagar, Moosarambagh, Rasoolpura, Vinayaka Veedhi, and Ambedkar Nagar, among many others. Houses, whether legally or illegally built — with or without official connivance — were submerged.
Temporary shelters were washed away. Workshops and factories constructed on the filled-up riverbed soil were drowned, along with vehicles inside. The cremation ground at Purana Pul went underwater. MGBS, built on what was once an island of the river and further raised with earth, naturally sank — half its platforms underwater, buses unable to park.
And yet, the very next day after such devastation, the chief minister could boast as usual that “a future city will be built that will outshine New York.” That shows how upside-down our society has become.
If we try to answer the basic question — why did Musi flood now? — We can clearly see the corruption, negligence, and servility of our political and administrative systems. This time, the flood was certainly not an act of nature.
One possible reason is that, to protect the lavish houses, palaces, farmhouses, and resorts built by the wealthy within the full-tank-level (FTL) zones of Himayat Sagar and Osman Sagar, officials deliberately released the water.
Another possible reason is that, by flooding the river, authorities sought to frighten and evict the poor and middle-class families who had lived for generations in houses along the river and refused to move. Yet another reason could be linked to Chief Minister Revanth Reddy’s announcement, soon after his London trip, that he would launch a Musi Beautification Scheme similar to the development along the Thames River.
The first explanation seems plausible because of the hasty release of water. Officials always have data on inflow rates, time required to fill reservoirs, and safe discharge levels. They are trained and paid for that. But since Government Order (GO) 111 — which prohibited construction in those catchment areas — was revoked, the rich, politicians, film stars, and industrialists have all built lavish properties within the FTL limits.
Officials, either corrupt or acting under orders, turned a blind eye. The much-hyped Hyderabad Disaster Management and Asset Protection Agency (HYDRAA), despite its grand name, did not lift a finger about these constructions.
Thus, the only remaining duty for reservoir and government officials was to ensure that not a drop of backwater entered the mansions, farmhouses, or resorts of the rich and powerful. That, to them, was their administrative dharma.
Hence, all gates were thrown open without hesitation, releasing thousands of cusecs of water downstream. What if the people below drowned, their houses sank, their clothes, utensils, books, and vehicles were washed away? Never mind—they were only helpless, poor labourers, lower-middle-class people. If need be, blame karma—the flood came because of their past deeds!
The second explanation also seems credible. Instead of focusing on relief and rehabilitation for flood victims, the government prioritised drone surveys of flooded riverbanks. For two years now, the government has been threatening to evict residents without providing alternative housing.
Now, by intentionally flooding the river, did they conduct drone mapping to establish the river’s FTL line and prepare to declare thousands of people encroachers once the flood recedes? Was the flood engineered with that ulterior motive? Perhaps. Anything is possible.
In Narsingi, floodwaters entered the cellar of Aditya Builders’ high-rise apartments — a sign that the structure lies within the riverbed or close to its bank. Yet officials are now saying they will begin to verify whether that building lies within the FTL or buffer zone. For the rich, encroachment is something to be “ascertained.” For the poor and middle class, it is declared in advance!
The third reason — that the present flood is connected to the Musi Beautification Project — is also possible. Soon after taking office, in January 2024, Chief Minister Revanth Reddy visited London and Dubai, saw the scenic roads and parks along the Thames, and declared he would do the same along the Musi.
He announced that the river would be rejuvenated within 36 months. The officials of Musi Riverfront Development Corporation then visited Gujarat’s Sabarmati, Varanasi’s Ganga, and Delhi’s Yamuna projects.
Though the scheme’s name faded from the headlines later, there may well be a link between those ongoing preparations and this flood. When the state government proposed the project on 3 January 2024, its cost was estimated at ₹58,000 crore; within six months, it rose to ₹70,000 crore; later to ₹1.5 lakh crore.
For such a massive project, with so much money to be made, the rulers will surely want it to proceed — by any means necessary.
(Views are personal. Edited by Muhammed Fazil.)
